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Introduction
The level and structure of unemployment insurance benefits vary greatly across countries and the rules which govern unemployment compensation are frequently changed. Such regulations, thus, do not constitute constraints for economic policy. They rather represent the outcome of the political process. While the political-economic determinants of unemployment benefits are fairly well known, the determinants of the maximum duration of unemployment insurance (UI) payments, the linkage between previous income and benefit levels, and the pertinent eligibility conditions are underresearched issues. These structural components of an UI system are, however, of great importance for the labour market consequences of unemployment benefits.
In this paper, we focus on the political-economic determinants of the earnings relationship of UI benefits. The earnings relationship is a highly visible, politically sensitive component of UI systems, which changes the payoffs of the directly affected interests in a predictable manner. Moreover, comparable data are available for OECD countries over a long time period. Analyzing the earnings relationship of UI benefits thus improves our understanding of a fundamental feature of the welfare state, and the availability of high quality data allows the derived hypotheses to be tested empirically.
We specifically address the question why the earnings relationship of UI benefits is higher in some countries than in others. Moreover, we investigate how the structure of the welfare state, proxied by the relation between previous earnings and UI benefits, will be affected by international economic integration. We provide answers to the above questions by, first, establishing the link between the earnings relationship of UI benefits and labour market outcomes in a unionised economy (Section 2). We show in particular that a higher earnings relationship will reduce wages if trade unions maximise the employees' bargaining surplus.
Second, we analyse how a political support maximizing government chooses the earnings relationship (Section 3). By assuming a given level of benefits, we focus on the benefit structure. Our analysis, thus, complements studies on the political economy of the level of unemployment compensation. The theoretical investigation (in Section 4) indicates that trade unions and left-wing governments favour a relatively low earnings relationship. This is because a more pronounced earnings relation can lower the trade union's payoff. International integration also affects the earnings relationship since product market competition reduces the scope for collective negotiations. Third, using data, inter alia, from the OECD's Database on Benefit Entitlements and Gross Replacement Rates for 19 countries for the period 1961 to 2003 we find support for the hypothesized domestic influences. The empirical analysis moreover shows that the earnings relationship varies negatively with openness.
Our paper is related to two different strands of literature: the political-economic theories of UI policy and the corresponding empirical investigations, and analyses of earnings-related UI benefits. The political-economic literature is still rather small. In a voting model of UI benefits, Wright (1986) analyses the individual incentives to establish unemployment insurance and shows that less than full coverage is chosen by the (employed) median worker. 1 Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) assume that UI benefits are not the result of a direct vote but are determined by the government to maximise its political support. A larger political weight of the firms can reduce benefits. This suggests that the level of UI is higher under left-wing governments. Neugart (2005) explains why countries with majoritarian electoral systems have lower replacement rates than those with proportional systems. Empirical investigations of the determinants of UI benefits generally employ the OECD's Database on Benefit Entitlements and Gross Replacement Rates. Using this dataset, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002) find a negative correlation between a right-wing orientation of the government and unemployment, on the one hand, and the level of benefits, on the other hand. Gaston and Noel (2004) observe that UI benefits rise with union density, a left-wing orientation of the government, and the openness of the economy, while Saint-Paul (1996) cannot identify any impact of the government's political orientation. 2 The theoretical literature on earnings-related UI benefits has dealt primarily with the economic consequences of altering the replacement rate. Lingens and Wälde (2006) have clarified that a higher replacement rate generally increases unemployment in models of collective wage determination, irrespective of the nature of the benefit system. A change in the replacement rate can, of course, be decomposed into a variation in the level of benefits and a change in the earnings relationship. Foucssing solely on the latter, that is, holding the level of UI benefits constant, Vijlbrief and van de Wijngaert (1995) show that a stronger earnings relationship increases unemployment in an economy with utilitarian trade unions. Goerke and Madsen (2003) obtain the reverse prediction for a trade union that maximises the gain of the employed workers from having a job. The intuition is that any increase in the unemployed workers' payoffs reduces the gain enjoyed by the employed union members. Beissinger and Egger (2004) , assuming a similar objective, derive a positive employment effect of a higher earnings-related replacement rate in a dynamic wage bargaining framework.
The subsequent analysis builds on the investigations of the labour market effects of earningsrelated UI benefits and tackles the issues which have been investigated by the existing political-economic literature with respect to the level of UI benefits: Namely, what determines the earnings relationship of UI benefits, and are the respective theoretical predictions consistent with the empirical evidence? In order to isolate the consequences resulting from the strength of the linkage between previous wages and UI benefits, and not to confuse these effects with the impact of a change in the level of benefits, the government is assumed to hold the benefit level constant. The instrument variable of the government is therefore the earnings relationship of UI benefits.
The Economic Sector
The economy consists of two sectors j, j = s, e. In the sheltered sector s, non-tradable goods are produced selling at a constant price p s . In the exposed sector e, tradable goods are manufactured. Their price is p e . The consumer price index is given by p. Wages are determined by collective bargaining. 3 There are many identical firms in each sector and one trade union in each firm. The number of firms -and therefore also the number of unions -is constant. Labour is assumed to be sector specific. Profits π s per (representative) sheltered sector firm consist of the price times output less labour costs, π s = p s f(n s ) -w s n s , where f is an increasing and strictly concave production function (f ' > 0, f '' < 0), n s the level of employment, and w s denotes the wage. In analogy, profits of a representative firm in the exposed sector are π e = p e f(n e ) -w e n e . Each firm bargains with 'its' union over the wage and then sets employment n j (w j , p j ).
A trade union can be utilitarian and maximise the sum of its members' utility. Alternatively, the trade union might be insider-dominated in that it maximises the gain (or rent, if riskneutral) of its members from employment at the union wage. Which of these two objectives prevails is an open empirical issue (Oswald 1982 , 1993 , Pencavel 1991 , pp. 54, 81-92, and Booth 1995 . Therefore, we assume that unions of either type may be present in each sector. Let the fraction λ j , 0 ≤ λ j ≤ 1, of all trade unions in sector j be utilitarian and the fraction (1 -λ j ) be insider-dominated. Each union has an exogenously given number of M j members, of which n j , n j ≤ M j , are employed. A member can be characterised by a strictly concave (indirect) utility function v( . ), v' > 0, v'' < 0, where v is a function of real income. The n j employed members earn the wage w j and thus enjoy the utility v(w j /p). The remaining M j -n j members obtain real UI benefits amounting to B j /p.
Nominal UI benefits B j consist of a (sector-specific) fixed component a j , a j > 0, and an income dependent component cw j , c ≥ 0: B j = a j + cw j . UI benefits are usually independent of the wage for those unemployed workers who have already been without a job before wage determination has taken place. This is the case since earnings-related benefits are a function of past income. The alternative income of workers who lose their jobs because of higher (real) wages will, however, be affected by the strength of the earnings relationship since their benefits are based on the new wage. Capturing these differential effects requires an explicitly dynamic approach. To circumvent this analytical extension, for simplicity, the income when not working at the union wage is assumed to be unemployment compensation.
The objective of a utilitarian trade union (indexed by u) in sector j, j = e, s, is given by:
The objective of an insider-dominated trade union (indexed by i) in sector j equals:
To analyse aggregate union behaviour, we make use of an 'average' union utility function U j :
The outcome of wage negotiations is determined by the Nash-solution. Both parties are endowed with the same bargaining power. The fixed fallback payoffs are determined by the situation in which no agreement is reached, and are normalised to zero. In the sheltered sector s maximisation of the Nash-product U s π s with respect to the wage, ruling out a corner solution, and defining ε s := (∂n s /∂w s )(w s /n s ) < 0, v := v(w s /p) and v := v (B s /p), yields:
The first bracketed term is proportional to the union's marginal gain from bargaining and positive for K s = 0. The second-order condition ∂K s /∂w s < 0 is assumed to hold (see Appendix I).
Suppose now that the government changes the structure of UI benefits by raising the earnings relationship and lowering the flat-rate component, while holding constant the respective levels B e and B s . Taking again the sheltered sector as an example, such a policy requires an increase in the parameter c and a change in the fixed component a s , so that dB s = da s + w s dc + cdw s = 0 holds, where the change dw s in the wage will be non-zero if the bargaining outcome is affected by the variation in the structure of benefits. From equation (2.4) we have:
where ∂ s K /∂w s < ∂K s /∂w s < 0 (∂ s K /∂w s being the change in K s due to a rise in the wage, evaluated at a constant level of benefits; See Appendix I). Thus, a stronger earnings relation of UI benefits will reduce the bargained wage if the fraction λ s of utilitarian unions is less than the ratio of employment n s to membership M s . This restriction is captured by:
Given an unemployment rate of substantially less than 20% in most industrialised countries, condition C will definitely be satisfied if the number of utilitarian unions relative to insiderdominated unions is not greater than 4 to 1. We will proceed from this assumption in the following analysis. Since the analysis for the sheltered sector carries over to the exposed sector, the employment performance of an economy locally improves when the earnings relationship of UI benefits becomes stronger (assuming a given level of unemployment compensation).
The intuition for the negative wage effect of a stronger earnings relationship of benefits is the following: The Nash-solution prescribes how the gains from bargaining are shared between the union and the firm. The firm's rise in profits is unaffected by a change in the earnings relationship. However, the union's gain from bargaining will be reduced if condition C holds since the increase in the payoff owing to a higher wage is lower for any given wage and benefit level, that is, the first term in brackets in equation (2.4) shrinks. Accordingly, any wage increase induces a more pronounced expansion in benefits than before the rise in c.
Therefore, a given augmentation of the wage induces a smaller gain for the union than before the change in c. Hence, the efficiency requirement of the Nash-solution implies that wages fall. 4
The Political Sector
The government maximises a political support function S which contains the unions' utilities and the firms' profits in both sectors as arguments. 5 The weights for aggregate trade union utility and aggregate profits are denoted by α and 1 -α, 0 < α < 1. The weight of unions and firms in the sheltered sector relative to that in the exposed sector is β, β ≥ 0. The fixed number of firms is normalised to unity. As mentioned in Section 1, the instrument variable of the government is the earnings relationship of UI benefits c, while the levels B s and B e are given.
The government can commit to its choice of the earnings relationship, and, as a Stackelbergleader, takes into account the repercussions of resulting changes in wages and employment.
Maximising S with respect to c, holding constant the level of benefits, yields:
The second-order condition S cc < 0 is assumed to be satisfied. Evaluated at the bargained wage and given condition C, the respective terms in equation (3.1) are given by:
A union's utility decreases with an increasing earnings-sensitivity of UI benefits. First, the negotiated wage is too low from the union's point of view (cf. equation (2.4)), owing to the firm's impact on the bargaining outcome. Therefore, a reduction in wages due to a stronger earnings relationship removes the union further from its optimal position. Second, a higher earnings relationship will reduce the trade union's gain from a given wage increase. This is the case since the impact of the wage on UI benefits rises. Thus, union utility declines for two reasons. In contrast, a firm benefits from a higher earnings sensitivity since wages fall. This induces higher profits. The government balances these counteracting influences at the margin.
Determinants of the Earnings Relationship
As outlined in the introduction, the political support maximizing earnings relationship c* may be affected by domestic determinants, such as the political orientation of the government or 5 Micro-foundations for the political support function approach are provided by Baldwin (1987) , Coughlin et al. (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1994) , and Yang (1995) , inter alia.
the political influence of trade unions and firms, and also by international economic integration. Thus, a change in c* over time or across countries can be explained, for example, by a greater power of unions as compared to firms, i.e., in the final analysis, by a greater influence of employees as compared to owners of firms. 6 A larger weight of trade unions in the political support function is portrayed in our model by a higher value of α.
Expression (4.1) then gives rise to:
For a given level of unemployment compensation and assuming that condition C holds, a larger political influence of the trade unions reduces the earnings relationship c* of UI benefits.
The parameter α may also reflect the political orientation of the government. If a more rightwing or conservative government places less emphasis on workers' interests, a lower value of α can also indicate a more right-wing government. We obtain:
For a given level of unemployment compensation and assuming that condition C holds, a right-wing government selects a stronger earnings relationship c* of UI benefits than a leftwing government.
The effects summarised in Predictions 1 and 2 occur because an increase in the earnings relationship, for a given level of UI benefits, will reduce the bargained wage if the share of utilitarian unions is not too high. Since lower wages reduce the trade unions' payoffs, a greater political influence of trade unions or their political representatives will induce the government to lower the earnings relationship. If, however, condition C does not hold, the bargained wage will rise with the earnings relationship of UI benefits. No attempt has yet been made to determine the fraction of utilitarian trade unions. Findings by Goerke and Madsen (2003) for 16 OECD countries suggest that wages and the earnings relationship of UI benefits are negatively correlated. This result is consistent with condition C and Predictions 1 and 2.
Recent decades have not only seen repeated changes in a government's political orientation in many OECD countries but also a deepening of international economic integration, resulting in stronger competition on goods and factor markets. In terms of our model, increased international competition can be interpreted as an increase in the political importance, or, alternatively, as an increase in the size of the exposed sector. Both effects reduce the weight β attached to firms and trade unions in the sheltered sector. Since the payoffs of trade unions and firms vary inversely with the earnings relationship of UI benefits, an increase in the political importance of the exposed sector has ambiguous effects on the optimal earnings relationship c*. A deepening of international economic integration via an increase in international factor mobility, in particular, enhances the mobility of firms across jurisdictions and, thus, raises their political influence (see, for example, Gaston and Noel 2004, Huber and Stephens 1998). If globalisation is viewed in such a manner, it can be modelled as a decline in the political importance of trade unions and will raise the earnings relationship of UI benefits (cf. Prediction 1). Finally, international integration can also give rise to a more competitive environment in the exposed sector. It is shown in Appendix II that the ensuing reduction in the price of tradable goods can lower the earnings relationship. We, therefore, have:
A change in the international integration of an economy affects the political support maximizing earnings relationship c* of UI benefits.
Our theoretical considerations suggest a rather complex relationship between the openness of an economy and the earnings relation of UI benefits. Unfortunately, the (joint) consequences of a larger exposed sector, higher firm mobility, and of price reductions for tradeable goods cannot be determined. Thus, the impact of globalisation on the earnings relationship of UI compensation is theoretically indeterminate and remains, ultimately, an empirical issue.
Data, Variables and Empirical Specifications

Data and Variables
Our dependent variable is a measure of the earnings relationship c of UI benefits. Even though c is not directly observable, it can be calculated on the basis of information from the OECD's Database on Benefit Entitlements and Gross Replacement Rates. This database provides information on gross replacement rates (RR) for average production workers (denoted RR 100 ) and workers earning two-thirds of the income of average production workers (RR 67 ) for a substantial time priod. The replacement rates include unemployment insurance and assistance, social welfare payments, as well as housing and family benefits. This data is available on a biannual basis from 1961 to 2003. 7 The values of RR 100 and RR 67 are on hand for different durations of unemployment (0-3, 4-6, 7-12, 13-24, 25-36, 37-48 The raw correlation coefficients between the earnings relationship for different unemployment durations d decrease as the duration of unemployment increases (see Table A1 in Appendix III). The decline in the raw correlation coefficients suggests that the determinants of the earnings relationship vary significantly over time. Moreover, the unweighted average of the earnings relationship c falls with the length of an unemployment spell, amounting to about 0.27 for a unemployment duration of less than 6 months and to almost zero for durations exceeding three years (see Table A2 in Appendix III).
The data consisting of our measures c_d and of the aggregate level of the replacement rate (RR_d), which is computed as an unweighted average of the overall values of RR 100 _d and RR 67 _d, are merged with information on the political influence of trade unions, the political preferences of the government, the openness of the economy and labour market tightness. 9
Prediction 1 states that the earnings relationship of benefits falls with a stronger political influence of unions. In the theoretical analysis of wage negotiations, union density has, for simplicity, and as it is usual in most models of collective bargaining, been normalised to unity. Nevertheless, in reality, union density is less than complete and the political influence of trade unions, especially in democracies, can be approximated by the number of its members, relative to employment. However, in our model the influence of trade unions is twofold since it is not only present in the political support function but also in the wage setting process. The employment impact of the earnings relationship of UI benefits will be the stronger the more comprehensive collective negotiations are, since the earnings relationship will not affect wages in a competitive labour market. This insight would suggest an indicator of collective-bargaining coverage as a further explanatory variable. However, while bargaining coverage varies substantially over time, no data set with bi-annual measures of the bargaining coverage in the OECD countries is available for the entire time period. As a substitute, we employ a measure of the centralisation of wage bargaining. In particular, we combine information on aggregate net union density 10 with time-variant information on the bargaining level at which wages are determined (from "plant-level" to "central wage setting") (BargUD). The hypothesis is that a union with a given net density has, ceteris paribus, a greater political influence the more centralised the wage setting process is, and that a trade union characterised by a higher density, for a given degree of centralisation, also has more political influence.
Prediction 2 states that a right-wing government selects a more pronounced earnings relationship of UI benefits. To capture government characteristics we, first, use an updated government composition index originally calculated by Cusack (1999) . Three groups of governments are distinguished: left governments (L G ) (consisting of social democratic parties and parties to their left), right governments (R G ) (consisting of liberal or conservative parties), and stalemate governments (S G ) (coalitions of parties). This information is included in the form of a dummy variable. Second, we employ a cabinet composition index which measures the percentage of total cabinet posts of "social democratic/other left parties", "centre parties", and "right-wing parties", weighted by the number of days in office. This cabinet 10 Net union density is defined as the number of employed union members relative to the sum of gainfully employed and unemployed. Gross union density incorporates all union members, including, for example, pensioners and students, into the numerator. It could, hence, be argued that also gross union density is an appropriate proxy of the political influence of trade unions. However, data on gross union densities is available only for a shorter time period and for fewer countries than on net densities. Since, moreover, the levels of and also the changes in gross and net densities are highly correlated for those periods and countries for which both are accessible, we use net union densities. composition index is multiplied by the "left-right scale" of government composition described above and aggregated across all cabinet parties to obtain a continuous "right-wing government (RW_G)" variable as an alternative to the dummy variable specification. 11
Finally, Prediction 3 relates the openness of an economy to the political support maximizing earnings relationship of UI benefits. Following, for example, Gaston and Nelson (2004) and
Agell (2002), we use the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP to arrive at a proxy for the economy's exposure to foreign trade (openness).
Since all of our theoretical predictions are conditional on a given level of unemployment compensation, the relevant aggregate level of the gross replacement rate (RR_d) is also included in our estimation procedures. Finally, we use the unemployment rate (UR) to take countryspecific labour market slack into account.
Empirical Specifications
Given the nature of our data, it is natural to exploit econometric panel data techniques in the empirical analysis. In a first step we employ Maddala and Wu's unit root test for panel data (Breitung and Pesaran 2005) to test for the time series properties of the (biannual) c_d data.
We can reject the null-hypothesis that all panel-specific c_d time series are non-stationary.
Moreover, in preliminary regressions the test-statistics based on Wooldridge's test for serial correlation (Wooldridge 2002 , Drukker 2003 ) indicate that we have to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a standard linear panel data model with fixed country and fixed year effects. Therefore, the idiosyncratic errors are modelled as a stationary AR(1) process. We include the contemporaneous level of the gross replacement rate since our theoretical predictions rely on a constant amount of UI benefits.
This assumption can also be justified empirically. Using a test of strict exogeneity as suggested by Wooldridge (2002) , we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the gross replacement rate is strictly exogenous for any specification in our sample. In our theoretical model the product of "bargaining level" and "net union density" (BargUD) 
where c i,t_ d is the duration specific earnings relationship of UI benefits, u i is a time invariant country effect, η t is a fixed time effect and the remainder disturbances ε i,t follow a stationary AR(1) process. All other regressors in equation (5.2) are defined as described above. As a check of robustness we also estimate a slightly modified version of (5.2) where we use our continuous "right-wing government" variable (RW_G) as an alternative to the two dummy variables S G and R G . We employ three econometric procedures: (1) a Prais-Winston regression with fixed country effects, fixed year effects and "panel-corrected standard errors", i.e. the standard errors are assumed to be heteroscedastic, first-order autocorrelated within panels with a common ρ and contemporaneously correlated across panels (Beck and Katz 1995) , (2) 
Results
The parameter estimates of the two specifications for the summary measure of the earnings relationship c of UI benefits are shown in Table 1 .
Table 1 about here
The estimates for BargUD, the interaction of net union density and the bargaining level, are always significant and indicate a negative correlation of the summary measure c of the earnings relationship and the political power of trade unions. Hence, the greater the political power of the trade union is, the weaker the earnings relationship of UI benefits becomes (for a given level of unemployment compensation). This is in line with Prediction 1. The size of the estimated effect might be illustrated as follows: In a fictitious country with a central wage setting system (e.g. Norway) and the mean value of our summary earnings relationship c, a 10 percentage point decrease in net union density induces, ceteris paribus, a 4.5% increase in the earnings relationship.
The parameter estimates of the government dummy variables S G and R G (L G is the reference dummy) suggest that right-wing governments choose a significantly higher summary earnings relationship c than left or stalemate governments (columns 1-3). Our results imply that a change in government (in a fictitious country) from Francois Mitterand to George W. Bush leads to an increase of roughly 10 % in the earnings relation. The same qualitative result will be obtained if we estimate the parameters of our second specification including the continuous variable RW_G (columns 4-6). Hence, there is supportive evidence for Prediction 2.
According to Prediction 3, global goods market integration affects the earnings relationship of benefits. The estimated parameters for our proxy for global goods market integration (Openness) are always significantly negative. A standard deviation increase in openness (31.574) goes along with a 25% decrease in the overall earnings relationship.
All of the theoretical predictions are conditional on a given level of UI benefits. Our parameter estimates for the summary replacement rate RR are always positive and highly significant. Hence, a more generous level of UI compensation goes hand in hand with a higher earnings relationship. Moreover, note that the parameter estimates for the lagged unemployment rate are never significantly different from zero in the specifications for the summary earnings relationship c of UI benefits. We, thus, find no evidence of an impact of the level of unemployment on the earnings relationship of UI benefits.
Our summary measure of the earnings relationship is based on data which include unemployment insurance payments, unemployment assistance and other transfers. The sensitivity of social assistance payments and housing benefits, for example, are likely to be determined by a government in a different manner than the earnings relationship of UI benefits. This might lead to measures of c which do not accurately describe the earnings relationship of the UI system, which is portrayed in our theoretical model. We, therefore, use measures of c for different durations of unemployment in our regression exercises to check for the robustness of our results. Table 2 shows the parameter estimates of the Prais-Winston regresssions with a robust variance matrix ("PCSE") for both specifications of (5.2): 12 Table 2 
about here
With respect to unemployment durations of up to 6 months, which in most countries are covered by UI systems, the only significant parameter estimate is that for the respective level of the replacement rate. Considering the estimated parameters for c_45, i.e. for very long unemployment durations of four to five years, we additionally find evidence that the political power of the trade unions and c_45 are negatively correlated. Moreover, for the two measures of the earnings relationship c (c_712 and c_23), which result from unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance and welfare payments and, hence, vary substantially across OECD countries, we observe parameter estimates similar to the ones obtained for the summary measure of the earnings relationship c. In particular, we find that trade union power, as well as (a lagged measure of) openness and the respective c_d values, are negatively correlated, and that right-wing governments tend to prefer higher earnings relationships of UI benefitsgiven the level of the replacement rate.
Summary
In this paper we model endogenous labour market regulation with the political support function approach. It is based on the insight that well-organised interests directly affected by a given policy measure will, in the final analysis, determine the political outcome. Assuming a unionised labour market, we show that the political influence of trade unions can reduce the earnings relationship of unemployment compensation. The reason is that a strong earnings relationship reduces wages (if the fraction of utilitarian unions is not too high). Lower wages, however, reduce union utility and thereby the union's political support for the government.
Moreover, we show that left-wing governments prefer a weaker earnings relationship of UI payments than centre or right-wing governments, and that globalisation exerts a distinct influence on the earnings relationship. To test these predictions we created a new data set for Tables   Table 1: ** significant at 1 %-level; * significant at 5 %-level; + significant at 10 %-level. ** significant at 1 %-level; * significant at 5 %-level; + significant at 10 %-level.
Appendix:
I) Second-Order Condition for Model of Section 2
The second-order condition implies ∂K s /∂w s < 0. Assuming a constant labour demand elasticity and omitting the superscript s on the right-hand-side of (I.1), ∂K s /∂w s equals: The second-order condition will unambiguously hold if the term in the curly brackets in (I.1) is negative. If K s is differentiated with respect to the wage w s for a given level of UI benefits B s , the wage change alters neither )
. This differential w K := ∂K s /∂w s │dB s = 0 is clearly negative for (1 -λM/n) ≥ 0, given the second-order condition.
[ ] 
II) The Open Economy Case (Prediction 3)
Assume that international integration reduces the prices of tradable goods. To capture this effect, let φ , 0 < φ ≤ 1, be a measure of the economy's openness and suppose, furthermore, that the price p e is a function of output, as long as the market for tradable goods is not perfectly competitive. The price p e can then, for example, be written as:
where ∂p e /∂φ < 0 holds by assumption. For φ = 1, the output price equals the constant world market price:
. Thus, an increase in φ, starting from a positive value below unity, indicates stronger international competition. Suppose, in addition, that the production function in the exposed sector is given by f e = (n e ) δ , 0 < δ < 1. Profits can then be expressed as:
Maximising profits with respect to employment and solving for n e yields:
The labour demand elasticity is ε e = 1/(δ φ -1) < -1. Moreover e φ ε = -δ/(δ φ -1) 2 < 0 holds.
The direction of the employment change (for a given wage) is ambiguous:
Holding the wage constant, profits π e = w e n e (1/(δφ) -1) decline with φ: 0 e p e p e n e w 2 e n 1 e n e w e < φδ
The wage in the exposed sector is (implicitly) defined by equation (2.4). Assume now that v is homogeneous in consumer prices, 13 and goods are consumed in fixed proportions, so that the consumer price index can be normalised to p = p s + p e . Cancelling common terms and substituting for n e , the first-order condition for v e := v e (w s /p) and 
For a given level of benefits, a rise in the parameter φ will unambiguously decrease the wage in the exposed sector if employment weakly increases with φ, that is if e n φ ≥ 0: where ∂ e K /∂w e < 0 is defined by ∂K e /∂w e evaluated at dB e = 0. The wage effect arises since an increase in φ reduces the rent to be shared. Moreover, the labour demand elasticity (ε e < 0) rises in absolute value. Profits in the exposed sector fall and the Nash-bargaining solution requires a decline in wages. As employment increases with globalisation, a stronger earnings relation reduces the union's payoff by less than before the rise in competition, also fostering a wage reduction. In the sheltered sector, the wage is not affected by φ, since the firm's revenues remain constant and because of the assumption of a homogeneous utility function.
Taking into account the wage effects summarised above, the consequences of an increase in φ on the government's optimal choice of the earnings relationship c* are determined via: The overall change in the marginal utility of the union in the exposed sector is determined by: The last term in (II.10) captures the same effect as in the sheltered sector. The third term, the wage effect, will also contribute to an increase in the union's opposition to a stronger earnings relationship if globalisation reduces wages ( e w φ < 0, cf. equation (II.7)). A proof is available upon request. Finally, the direct employment impact will reduce the union's marginal gain from a stronger earnings relationship if e n φ > 0 holds. But irrespective of the sign of e n φ , the overall impact of a change in φ on the union's marginal utility in the exposed sector is ambiguous, due to the second term, the elasticity effect.
A firm's payoff in the sheltered sector is not affected by an increase in φ ( 0 s c = φ π ). The gain from a higher earnings relationship of UI benefits for firms in the exposed sector will unambiguously be positive if employment weakly rises with greater competition ( e n φ ≥ 0): Summing up, we find that the costs of a stronger earnings relationship suffered by the union in the sheltered sector increase with φ. The firm in the sheltered sector is unaffected. Moreover, the impact on the union in the exposed sector is ambiguous, while the gain of firms in the exposed sector rises, given condition C. Thus, a more competitive exposed sector reduces the earnings relation of UI benefits for a given level of unemployment compensation, as long as the political weight of trade unions in the sheltered sector is sufficiently high. 
III) Descriptive Statistics
